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CONTRACT INTERPRETATION: THE PLAIN
MEANING RULE IN LABOR ARBITRATION
CARL TON J SNOW*
The purpose of interpretation as justice requires is always the dis-
covery of actual intention:-the intentions of both parties if they are
the same,-the actual intention of one party if the other knew or had
reason to know what it was,-but absolutely never to give effect to a
meaning of words that neither party in fact gave them, however many
other people might have given them that meaning. 1
INTRODUCTION
ARBITRATION decisions often turn on the interpretation of con-
tract language, and numerous arbitrators base their awards on the
plain meaning of collective bargaining agreements.2 Application of what
has been characterized as the plain meaning rule3 as a standard of con-
tract interpretation requires that the meaning of contractual language be
determined solely by attaching the plain or usual meaning to words that
appear clear and unambiguous on the face of an agreement.4 Conse-
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Center for Dispute Resolution, Willam-
ette University Law School; B.A. 1962, Taylor University; M. Div. 1965, Fuller Theolog-
ical Seminary; M.A. 1966, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1969, University of Wisconsin.
The author acknowledges with gratitude a research grant from the Atkinson Fund of
Willamette University which was an invaluable aid in the development of this Article.
1. 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, Preface (rev. ed. 1960).
2. The number of arbitration decisions decided either expressly or impliedly under
the plain meaning rule is overwhelming. See e.g., Harbison-Walker Refractories v.
United Steelworkers Local 531, 81-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 4354, 4356 (1981) (Byars,
Arb.) ("As the company points out, past practice is a standard for contract interpretation
only when the contract is ambiguous. The clear language of a contract has been enforced
even where the results are harsh and inequitable."); Controls for Radiation, Inc. v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 1, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 578, 583 (1966) (Stouffer,
Arb.) ("The history of bargaining, parol evidence, and past practices should not in the
opinion of this arbitrator be used to give meaning to, overrule, or evade contractual pro-
visions which are clear and unambiguous."); see generally F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works 348-50 (4th ed. 1985).
3. The plain meaning rule should not be confused with the "four corners" rule,
which is relevant to the issue of contract integration. According to the "four corners"
rule, when an instrument is "complete on its face," the determination of whether it is a
total integration must be made from the instrument itself. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
The Law of Contracts § 3-3, at 103 n.29 (2d ed. 1977).
4. For other statements of this rule, see 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 535,
542 (rev. ed. 1960 & Supp. 1984); 9 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2461, at 196
(rev. ed. 1981); 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 609 (3d ed. 1961 &
Supp. 1986).
The plain meaning rule is inapplicable when contract language is ambiguous; terms
deemed to have a plain meaning are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable; terms
have several meanings listed in the dictionary and the "appropriate" meaning must be
selected, and "local trade or special usage" gives a term a meaning that varies from its
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quently, the plain meaning rule often operates to exclude extrinsic evi-
dence5 offered to explain the intentions of the contracting parties.' In
many cases, evidence of a past practice7 of the contracting parties at
variance with express provisions of their agreement is disregarded when
an arbitrator invokes the plain meaning rule. As a result, the rule has
produced arbitral opinions based on interpretations of collective bargain-
ing agreements contrary to the intentions of either party.
Although favored a century ago, the plain meaning rule has been re-
jected by the Uniform Commercial Code (the U.C.C. or the Code)8 and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the Restatement),9 and con-
demned by treatise writers.1" In addition, the rule has been discredited
by an increasing number of courts. I I Significantly, recent court decisions
recognize that labor arbitrators have broad authority to consider extrin-
sic evidence in addition to the actual language of the agreement. 12 Nev-
plain meaning. See Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 833, 839 (1964).
As applied in the field of statutory construction, the rule theoretically operates to ex-
clude extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, in the interpretation of statutes. See
generally, Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Fed-
eral Statutes, 25 Wash. U.L.Q. 2, 25-26 (1939) (despite theoretical restriction of plain
meaning rule, courts interpret statutes using extrinsic aids, which contribute to an intelli-
gent comprehension of meaning and purpose of statute).
5. Extrinsic evidence is a broad category of evidence offered to prove the meaning of
a written instrument. Parol evidence, evidence of prior and contemporaneous agreements
and negotiation, is one type of extrinsic evidence. For examples of extrinsic evidence in
collective bargaining agreements, see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960) (relevant legislation); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) (practice of industry); Humble Oil
and Refining Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 866, 447 F.2d 229, 232 (2d
Cir. 1971) (bargaining history).
6. The exclusionary effect of the plain meaning rule is the primary reason the rule is
considered to be closely related to the parol evidence rule. Like the plain meaning rule,
the parol evidence rule generally is regarded as a rule of substantive contract law and not
a rule of evidence. "The so-called parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence and has no
application in the process of interpretation of a written instrument." Corbin, The Inter-
pretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 189 (1965).
7. For the definition of a past practice, see infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
8. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment l(b) (1978).
9. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 comment b (1981).
10. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 4, § 543; C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence
§ 219 (1954) (this section is omitted in later editions); J. Murray, Grismore on Contracts
§ 110 (rev. ed. 1965); A. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
Law, ch. 10 (1898); 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 4, §§ 2461-62; 4 S. Williston, supra note 4,
§ 629.
11. See infra notes 56-80 and accompanying text. But see International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Teter Tool & Die, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (arbitrators should
not interpret unambiguous language differently from its plain meaning because that
amends or alters the agreement).
12. See, e.g., Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982)
(arbitrator can rely on several extrinsic aids to construe intent of parties); Norfolk Ship-
building & Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684, 671 F.2d 797, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1982) (arbi-
trator can rely on customs and practices of particular plant and industry); Ludwig
Honold Mfg. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) ("labor arbitrator's award
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ertheless, arbitrators continue to make frequent use of the plain meaning
rule.1
3
This Article analyzes the application of the plain meaning rule in labor
arbitration awards in an attempt to reconcile the anomaly that exists:
while courts are progressing toward rejection of the rule, arbitrators con-
tinue to rely on it. Part I discusses the anatomy of the plain meaning
rule. Part II addresses its rejection by the courts. Part III analyzes arbi-
tration decisions in which the plain meaning rule has been invoked. Part
IV examines alternatives to the plain meaning approach. Because the
general aim of contractual interpretation is to effectuate the intention of
the parties, this Article concludes with a formulation of an approach that
embodies this objective.14
I. ANATOMY OF THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
One court has described the application of the plain meaning rule as a
process by which "words of the parties [are run] through a judicial sieve
whose meshes [are] incapable of retaining anything but the common
meaning of the words, and which permit[s] the meaning which the par-
ties had placed upon them to run away as waste material." 5 The rule is
commonly understood to bar consideration of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing, if that writing is characterized as plain or clear. 6
The plain meaning rule, accordingly, raises a preliminary issue of ad-
missibility. Extrinsic evidence is irrelevant unless the interpreting court
or arbitrator first concludes that the contractual language is ambiguous.
Courts disagree over whether extrinsic evidence may be admitted to
prove the existence of ambiguity. Some judges adopt a plain meaning
... 'draw[s] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' if the interpretation can
in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its
context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention"); see also P. Prasow & E. Peters,
Arbitration and Collective Bargaining: Conflict Resolution in Labor Relations (2d ed.
1983). "An examination of many reported arbitration decisions suggests there is wide-
spread, although not unanimous, agreement among arbitrators as to some basic standards
for interpreting contract language. Foremost among these criteria are: (1)specific lan-
guage is controlling over general language, (2)clear and unambiguous language generally
prevails over past practice." Id. at 104-05.
13. An effort to make arbitrators aware of the progress made in rejecting the plain
meaning rule previously has been urged. See Goetz, Comment to Mueller, in Mueller,
The Law of Contracts--A Changing Legal Environment, Proceedings of the 31st Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 218, 222 (BNA 1979) ("To my mind, this
coup de gr-ice to the plain-meaning rule represents a development in the law of which
arbitrators ought to be aware.").
14. This objective of contract interpretation assumes that the parties had the same
meaning in mind and it is possible to discover what that meaning was. A more realistic
aim of interpretation, stated by Murray, is "to approximate as closely as we may, consist-
ently with proper precautionary safeguards, that meaning... [of) manifestations in ques-
tion should reasonably have anticipated would be attributed to them by the other party,
in the light of all the surrounding circumstances known to both parties." J. Murray,
supra note 10, § 95, at 151.
15. Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 141 Or. 306, 314, 16 P.2d 627, 630 (1932).
16. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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approach and determine from their own point of view whether the writ-
ten words are ambiguous.17 Other courts hold that a judge must consider
alternative meanings advocated by the parties and the nature of the ob-
jective evidence offered in support of a meaning.' 8 Under the latter ap-
proach, the linguistic reference point of the parties, instead of the judge,
determines whether a contractual provision is reasonably susceptible to
different meanings.
The plain meaning rule is a vestige of an earlier, formalistic period of
contract interpretation. 9 The troublesome nature of legal interpreta-
tion2" has prompted various attempts to establish rules that may be uni-
formly applied to interpret writings.2" The plain meaning rule survives,
despite its criticism from many quarters.22
17. See, e.g., Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (test for
ambiguity is to look solely at writing to determine if it is susceptible to multiple interpre-
tations); Kass v. William Norwitz Co., 509 F. Supp. 618, 625 (D.D.C. 1980) (court deter-
mines whether contract unambiguous, and if so, plain meaning rule applies).
18. See, e.g., Griesmann v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d
Cir. 1985) (extrinsic evidence admissible to show parties attached special meaning to
wording of contract); Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 738 F.2d 1434, 1439 (5th Cir.
1984) (ambiguity of document cannot be assessed merely by looking within its four cor-
ners); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.
1980) (linguistic reference points of parties should be examined to determine if ambiguity
exists); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 597 F. Supp. 946, 950 (D.D.C. 1985)
(court should consider reasonable alternative meanings set forth by parties); Mayer v.
Development Corp. of Am., 541 F. Supp. 828, 857 (D.N.J. 1981) (same), aff'd mem., 688
F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1982); Z & L Lumber Co. of Atlasburg v. Nordquist, 348 Pa. Super.
580, 583, 502 A.2d 697, 700 (1985) (same).
19. "The formalist theory of adjudication asserts that legal disputes can be, should be,
and are resolved by recourse to legal rules and principles, and the facts of each particular
dispute." Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151, 155 (1981).
20. For a discussion of the earlier view, see generally 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 4,
§ 2461, at 193 ("history of the law of interpretation is the history of a progress from a stiff
and superstitious formalism to a flexible rationalism"); McBaine, The Rule Against Dis-
turbing Plain Meaning of Writings, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 145 (1943); Williams, Language and
the Law-I, 61 Law Q. Rev. 71 (1945).
For the purposes of this Article, legal interpretation is defined to encompass the pro-
cess by which arbitrators or the courts attach meaning to contract language. A number
of writers distinguish "interpretation" from "construction." See 4 S. Williston, supra
note 4, § 600A; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 200 comment c (1981) (list-
ing commentators and cases that distinguish between "interpretation" and "construc-
tion"). Corbin defines "interpretation" as it relates to contracts as the "process whereby
one person gives a meaning to the symbols of expression used by another person." 3 A.
Corbin, supra note 4, § 532, at 2. In contrast, "construction" is the determination of a
contract's "legal operation-its effect upon the action of courts and administrative offi-
cials." Id., § 534, at 9.
For a discussion of interpretation theory, see generally J. Cueto-Rua, Judicial Methods
of Interpretation of the Law (1981); Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899); Pound, Introduction to A. Silveira, The Political and Social
Factor in Legal Interpretation, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 599 (1947).
21. One such rule, attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, was that oral evidence is admissi-
ble to aid in the interpretation of a writing if there is a latent ambiguity, but not to resolve
a patent ambiguity. See McBaine, supra note 20, at 147.
22. Legal interpretation is a process probably incapable of being reduced to a definite
formula. See Moore, supra note 19, at 167.
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The rule reflects the formalistic judicial belief that words are symbols
with fixed meanings, and parties to a writing should be held to that
meaning, regardless of whether it coincides with their intention.23 The
belief in the possibility of perfect verbal expression is thought to have
originated from "primitive" legal systems in which individuals placed
faith in the "inherent potency" of words rather than the intention of the
parties. 24
Writings on law and language amply demonstrate that a theoretical
weakness inherent in the rule is its assumption that words are capable of
having unambiguous meaning. Application of the plain meaning rule re-
quires the preliminary step of characterizing contractual language as
either plain or ambiguous. Because the rule does not give the courts gui-
dance on how to make this determination, decision-makers are left with
the difficult task of determining, as a matter of law, whether a written
agreement is clear or ambiguous.25
Semanticists and philosophers have long been concerned with the con-
cept of ambiguity to explain the elusiveness of language. 6 In addition,
courts have struggled with defining language judicially determined am-
23. See 9 J. Wigmore, supra note 4, § 2461.
24. The court in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968) recognized this inherent weakness
of the plain meaning rule. The court quoted S. Ullman, The Principles of Semantics 43
(1959):
The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in primitive groups;
the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the apotheosis of the word, and of Thoth,
the Scribe of Truth, the Giver of Words and Script, the Master of Incantations;
the avoidance of the name of God in Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemis-
tic and protective names in mediaeval Turkish and Finno-Ugrian languages; the
misplaced verbal scruples of the 'Precieuses'; the Swedish peasant custom of
curing sick cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page torn
out of the psalter and put in dough ....
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 35, 442
P.2d 641, 643 n.2, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 n.2 (1968).
25. See, eg., Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1180 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (determining
whether a contract is ambiguous is a legal question), cert denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981);
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
The theory of the plain meaning doctrine suggests that the ambiguity must be discover-
able on a bare or literal reading of the text without resorting to the context and surround-
ing circumstances that the extrinsic sources provide. Jones, supra note 4, at 11; see also
Appalachian Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 529 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir.) (party
to unambiguous contract cannot reach outside the agreement for an argument seeking to
impart uncertainty), cert denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). Many courts that find words un-
ambiguous, however, do so only after an examination of extrinsic evidence of surround-
ing circumstances. See, eg., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Local 866, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 447 F.2d 229, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1971) (arbitration board acted within its scope
in considering parties' previous practices and bargaining history of the contract to con-
strue provisions of contract); Airborne Freight Corp. v. McPherson, 427 F.2d 1283,
1285-86 (9th Cir. 1970) (district court judge correctly concluded that corporate merger
agreement was unambiguous after receiving affidavits, prior drafts of the merger agree-
ment, information sent to stockholders, and other extrinsic evidence).
26. See generally Moore, supra note 19.
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biguous. Generally, courts agree that ambiguity in a contractual provi-
sion is not established merely because the contracting parties disagree
about the meaning of a provision.27 The prevailing view is that courts
should consider objective rather than subjective manifestations of con-
tractual intent.2 s Courts generally have concluded that a contractual
provision is ambiguous if it is "reasonably susceptible" to more than one
construction or interpretation.29
If language is ambiguous to the extent that it is capable of assuming
different "meanings," defining ambiguity ultimately turns on a formula-
tion of a concept of "meaning." Semanticists Ogden and Richards con-
tend that "meaning" is a function of thought, symbolized by a word that
refers to an object.3 1 In their view, words have no inherent meaning un-
less a speaker or writer makes use of them.31 Words are symbols that
stimulate mental references to objects. This analysis of "word" and "ob-
ject"-that the relation of the word to the object is indirect by virtue of
the intervention of thought-underlies the idea that there is not a fixed
and inevitable connection between "word" and "object. '32 The meaning
that a speaker or writer intends the words to convey may vary signifi-
cantly from the meaning that the words actually convey to others.33
27. See Harrison Western Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1981);
Boudreau v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 616 F.2d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 1980); Blake
Constr. Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1357, 1359 n.16 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Associated Stu-
dents v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 120 Ariz. 100, 104, 584 P.2d 564, 568 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); Vickers v. North Am. Land Devs., 94 N.M. 65,
68, 607 P.2d 603, 606 (1980).
Arbitrators operate under a similar agreement. "Not infrequently, both parties will
argue that the contract language unambiguously supports their respective claims, and the
arbitrator will not only disagree with them both but will even declare a third meaning to
be unambiguously expressed by the language!" P. Prasow & E. Peters, supra note 12, at
91.
28. The objective theory of contract interpretation sets up a standard of "reasonable
expectation" based on what one party reasonably believes the other party is referring to.
The subjective theory takes into account the parties' actual expectations. See Farns-
worth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 946-52 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1981); Uni-
versal Towing Co. v. United Barge Co., 579 F.2d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1978); see also
supra note 7. This definition suggests that the meanings need not be contradictory. The
provision merely may cover two alternative meanings.
30. C. Ogden & I. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 8-23 (8th ed. 1948). The au-
thors diagram their theory by a triangle. The word and the object (the term "referent" is
coined) are at the two base angles, and thought is at the apex. The object either causes a
thought in the mind of the speaker, and he or she uses a word to express a thought, or,
the word provokes a thought which refers to the object. Id. at 10-12.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Farnsworth points out, however, that the contribution of semantics to the search
for the meaning of contract language is limited. He maintains that semanticists are con-
cerned with language as it is used in science to describe experience, and, consequently,
with the truth. Because the objective of contract language is to control behavior, inter-
preters of contract language are concerned primarily with the expectation that the lan-
guage incites in the contracting parties, and with truth only secondarily. See Farnsworth,
supra note 28, at 941-42.
33. Imprecision in the use of language is explained by Skinner as a consequence of the
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Meaning also has been analyzed by some philosophers in terms of the
reference or extension of a word, and its sense or intention.' Ogden and
Richards, among others, have rejected this definition. 35 They have iden-
tified sixteen primary definitions of "meaning," as the word has been
used by philosophers. 36 At least eight possible definitions of "meaning"
relevant to contractual interpretation have been formulated by Judge
Kenneth O'Connell, a former member of the Oregon Supreme Court.37
Other concepts of "meaning" have been adopted by the Restatement38
and discussed by commentators. 39 The controversy surrounding the
meaning of "meaning," therefore, frustrates the search for the plain
meaning of contractual language.
The elusiveness of the English language is a primary source of diffi-
culty in attaching a fixed or absolute meaning to written or spoken
words.' Case law provides a vast number of examples of the imprecision
conditioning process, which precedes the learning of the use of a word. B.F. Skinner,
Verbal Behavior 29-30 (1957). "The responses given to a list of stimulus words naturally
depend on the verbal history of the speaker." Id. at 75.
34. See Moore, supra note 19, at 167 (referring to G. Frege, On Sense and Reference
in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (P. Geach & M. Black
eds. 1970)).
35. C. Ogden & I. Richards, supra note 30, at 189-91.
36. Id. at 186-87.
37. (1) that which the promisor believed the promisee understood the promisor
was referring to; ... (2) that which the promisor should reasonably expect the
promisee to understand the promisor was referring to; ... (3) that which the
promisor intends the promisee to understand;... (4) that to which the promisor
ought to be referring ("common usage"); (5) that to which the promisor refers;
(6) that to which the promisee refers; (7) that to which the promisee believes
himself to be referring;... (8) that to which the promisee believes the promisor
to be referring ....
K. O'Connell, Comments on the Judicial Decision Making Process 51-52 (1982) (printed
by Willamette University School of Law, Salem, Oregon).
38. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 202(3)(a) & (b) (1981) (language
should be interpreted with its "generally prevailing meaning .... Technical terms and
words of art are given their technical meaning.").
39. See Farnsworth, supra note 28, at 951, states that
'[m]eaning' for the purpose of contract interpretation should therefore be de-
fined as: (1) that to which either party refers, where it can be determined and
where it can be established that it is the same as that to which the other party
refers, or believes or has reason to believe the first party to be referring; and,
only failing this, (2) that to which either party has reason to believe the other to
be referring.
See also Moore, supra note 19, at 167-80 (discussing three theories of "meaning" relevant
to legal formalism: the referential, the logical positivist, and the subjectivist alternative to
the logical positivists); Williams, Language and the Law-IV, 61 Law Q. Rev. 384, 392
(1945) (setting forth three varieties of meaning: intended, comprehended, and ordinary
meaning).
40. See generally Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 619 (1964). Semanticists and philosophers use the concepts of ambiguity and vague-
ness to describe the imprecision of language. The terms are distinguishable: "The idea of
a central norm is useful in explaining the concept of vagueness, for a word is vague to the
extent that it can apply to stimuli that depart from its central norm.... [A] word may
also have two entirely different connotations .... Such a word is ambiguous." Farns-
worth, supra note 28, at 953 (discussing Quine's definition of those terms in Quine, Word
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
of language. In one celebrated passage, Justice Holmes observed that
"[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used."41 Similarly, Judge
Learned Hand stated that, "[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposi-
tion; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the mean-
ing of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their
purport from the setting in which they are used."42 These views recog-
nize the extent to which the text of a contractual provision can merge
with the context of its formation, and how the meaning of a word is
conditioned by the factual circumstances that surround its use.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE RULE
The basic premise of the plain meaning rule, that words are capable of
plain and unambiguous meaning, finds little support today in semantics,
philosophy or legal commentaries. Consequently, an increasing number
of courts, following the U.C.C.43 and the Restatement" reject the rule.
In general, the Code expresses a policy favoring admission of extrinsic
evidence to show the contractual intent of the parties.4" Specifically, the
Code recognizes three sources of extrinsic evidence admissible to explain
the meaning of contract terms:46 course of performance, course of deal-
ing, and trade usage.47
The Code departs from the plain meaning rule by providing that con-
and Object 85 (1960)). See also Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 Minn. L.
Rev. 885, 911 (1964) ("Vagueness is an inescapable aspect of our language .... [It] is
sometimes an indispensable tool for the achievement of accuracy and precision in lan-
guage."); Moore, supra note 18, at 181-83, 193-95 (grouping ambiguity into semantic and
syntactic categories and identifying three senses in which a word may be vague).
41. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
42. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
43. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) (course of dealing, usage of trade, course of perform-
ance, and sometimes consistent additional terms can explain or supplement writing).
44. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 (1981) (integrated agreement inter-
preted according to meaning of terms of writing in "light of the circumstances").
45. Levie, The Interpretation of Contracts In New York Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 10 N.Y.L.F. 350, 350-51 (1964).
46. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) provides in relevant part that:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory accident should be made on the basis of
a calendar week or a work week. Both parties agreed that the consistent past practice
with respect to industrial injury pay had been to use the work week, with the result that
employees received more money than they would have if wages were calculated on a
calendar week basis. The arbitrator decided that the contract memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the pareties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (section 1-205) or by course of per-
formance (section 2-208).
47. See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1978) (defining course of dealing and usage of trade), § 2-208
(defining course of performance).
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sideration of evidence of these three sources is not contingent on an ini-
tial determination that the contractual language is ambiguous.4"
Extrinsic evidence is always relevant to determine the meaning of an
agreement.49 Moreover, the Code rejects "the premise that the language
used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construc-
tion existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the
commerical context in which it was used."'50
White and Summers suggest that the Code also rejects the notion, im-
plicit in the plain meaning rule, that once the language is determined to
be unambiguous, it cannot be altered by extrinsic evidence.5 Moreover,
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance may them-
selves constitute contract terms or even override express terms.52
The parol evidence rule, as set forth in the Restatement, is in accord-
ance with section 2-202 of the Code in its rejection of the plain meaning
rule.53 The Restatement provides that although "[i]t is sometimes said
that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a writing,....
meaning can almost never be plain except in context."' 54 The Restate-
ment does not condition the admissibility of extrinsic evidence on an ini-
tial finding of ambiguity. 55
A steady stream of cases has sharply criticized the plain meaning
rule.56 In United States v. Lennox Metal Manufacturing Co., 5 a case
that ultimately did not turn on the interpretation of contractual lan-
guage, the Second Circuit warned about dangers of the exclusionary im-
pact of the plain meaning rule. As the court observed, "To shut out the
light furnished by the parties themselves-to read their words not as they
meant them but as they appear when denuded of that meaning-is to
48. U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment l(c) (1978), rejects "[t]he requirement that a
condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a)
is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous."
49. Further, an official comment to U.C.C. § 2-202 provides that "[u]nless carefully
negated they have become an element of the meaning of the words used." U.C.C. § 2-202
official comment 2 (1978).
50. U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment l(b) (1978).
51. See J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 3-3 (2d ed. 1980).
52. See id
53. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(1) (1981). The drafters of the Re-
statement expressed their intent to be guided by the parol evidence section of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See American Law Institute Proceedings, Forty-eighth Annual Meet-
ing 442 (1971).
54. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 comment b (1981).
55. Id ("ITihe rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is deter-
mined that the language used is ambiguous.").
56. See infra notes 57-80 and accompanying text. In an early case, the Supreme
Court stated that "a rigid adherence to the letter often leads to erroneous results, and
misinterprets the meaning of the parties." Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U.S. 23, 30 (1877);
see also Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 312, 154 N.W.2d 164, 171 (1967) ("Proof
of the circumstances may make a meaning plain and clear when in absence of such proof
some other meaning may also have seemed plain and clear.").
57. 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).
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decide an unreal, fictitious, hypothetical case."" The court concluded
that application of the rule allowed an interpreter of contractual lan-
guage to "artificialize the facts."59
It was not until Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co.6 0 that courts forged a frontal attack on the plain meaning
rule. The California Supreme Court opinion by Justice Traynor rejected
the trial court's application of the rule.6 The defendant had offered ad-
missions of the plaintiff's agents, the defendant's conduct under similar
contracts with the plaintiff, and other evidence, to prove that the parties
intended the indemnity clause to cover damage to property of third par-
ties only, and not to the plaintiff's property.62 The trial court had re-
fused to consider this extrinsic evidence,63 maintaining that the "plain
language" of the clause required the defendant to indemnify the
plaintiff.' 4
The California Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that ex-
clusion of extrinsic evidence on this basis, in effect, attaches meaning to
disputed contractual language in accordance with the judge's own "lin-
guistic education and experience."6 Maintaining that words do not have
absolute and constant referents, the court therefore stated that the rule
"presuppose[s] a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has
not attained."66 The court held that the proper test of admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to aid in contractual interpretation is not whether the
instrument appears to be plain or unambiguous, "but whether the offered
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is reason-
ably susceptible."67
The Thomas Drayage court held that extrinsic evidence is always ad-
missible, both to prove the existence of ambiguous contractual language
and to resolve the ambiguity. This approach to the plain meaning rule
has been cited approvingly by many courts.6 The position of the
58. Id. at 313.
59. Id.
60. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641; 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
61. Id. at 37, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
62. Id., 442 P.2d at 643, 69 Cal. Rptr, at 563.
63. Id. at 40, 442 P.2d at 646, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
64. Id., 442 P.2d at 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
65. Id. at 38, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (quoting Corbin, The Interpreta-
tion of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)); see also 3 A.
Corbin, supra note 4, at 189. "[The Court] is making an interpretation on the sole basis
of the extrinsic evidence of its own linguistic experience and education, of which it merely
takes judicial notice.").
66. Thomas Drayage, 69 Cal. 2d at 37, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
67. Id., 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564. The "reasonably susceptible" test of
Thomas Drayage, used to determine the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain con-
tract terms, is distinct from ambiguous contract language that some courts define as "rea-
sonably susceptible" to different meanings. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
68. See Sherman v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1980);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Chicago M. St. P. & PR Co., 502 F.2d 193, 195 n.3 (7th Cir.
1974); Kesling v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 449 F.2d 770, 771 (9th Cir.
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Thomas Drayage court was recently confirmed in Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
Aetna Business Credit, Inc 19 Mellon Bank involved an alleged breach of
contract by a permanent lender to purchase a construction loan from a
short-term construction lender. The case turned on the interpretation of
the word "insolvency" in the buy-sell agreement, because the permanent
lender maintained that its obligation to purchase the loan was contingent
on the borrowers' solvency.7" The trial court had considered extrinsic
evidence to adopt a definition of "solvency" that departed from the tradi-
tional commercial standard of solvency.
The appellate court held that consideration of this evidence was
proper.7 Adopting the same approach as Thomas Drayage7 2 the court
maintained that a judge must determine from the "linguistic reference
point of the parties [whether] the terms of the contract are susceptible of
differing meanings."73 In support of its position, the Mellon Bank court
disputed that words have fixed meanings, stating that "English is often a
difficult and elusive language, and certainly not uniform among all who
use it."74
The court further held that under its approach, "[i]t is the role of the
judge to consider the words of the contract, the alternative meaning sug-
gested by counsel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be offered
in support of that meaning."7" If the parties suggest a reasonable alter-
native interpretation, the judge should consider objective evidence in sup-
port of that interpretation, even though it may be alien to the judge's
linguistic experience.7 6 The court made clear that its approach did not
relegate the written word to a reduced status and that "the parties re-
main bound by the appropriate objective definition of the words they use
to express their intent."77
Thomas Drayage and its progeny, thus have followed the U.C.C. and
the Restatement, demonstrating movement toward rejecting the extreme
1971) (per curiam); American Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg., 353 N.W.2d
592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Anderson v. Uanneier, 262 N.W.2d 360, 370 n.2 (S. Ct.
Minn. 1978); Harrigan v. Mason & Winograd, Inc., 121 RI. 209, 211, 397 A.2d 514, 516
(1979); Simpson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 382 A.2d 198, 199-200 (Vt.
1977). But see Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 438-39, 682 P.2d 1100, 1107,
204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 442 (1984) (Mosk, J., concurring).
69. 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
70. Id at 1008-09.
71. Id at 1013-14. The Court held, however, that the evidence was not sufficient to
warrant variation of the commonly used commercial standard of insolvency.
72. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442 P.2d 641, 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968).
73. Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011.
74. Id at 1010.
75. Id at 1011. The courts in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442 P.2d 641, 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968), and
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980), held
that the question of whether the contract language is susceptible to differing meanings
should be measured by a reasonableness standard.
76. Id at 1011 (footnote omitted).
77. Id at 1013.
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form of the plain meaning rule.7" Although views of the rule expressed
in the Restatement, the Code, and the cases are traceable to the influence
of Professor Corbin's criticism of the rule,7 9 courts rejecting the rule
maintain that criticism of the plain meaning approach has an even more
ancient lineage.80
The rule has been rejected principally because the basic premise of the
rule, that words are capable of unambiguous meaning, is a proposition
unsupported in the disciplines of semantics, philosophy, or common law.
The exclusionary effect of the rule on the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence offered to explain contract terms has been held to undermine the
basic aim of contract interpretation, which is to discover the parties' ob-
jective intent. Application of the rule invariably has led to the substitu-
tion of a judge's perception of the parties' intent, in place of the parties'
actual intent. Courts rejecting the rule have striven to adopt an approach
to contract interpretation that, at least in theory, permits the parties' in-
tent to be effectuated.
III. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE IN ARBITRATION DECISIONS
A. The Decision to Invoke the Rule
The judicial trend to reject the plain meaning rule contrasts with the
stricter application of the rule in many labor arbitration decisions. The
rule invariably is applied to exclude extrinsic evidence when an arbitrator
determines that contract language is clear and unambiguous.8"
The application of the rule to collective bargaining agreements is an
outgrowth of the commercial setting in which the rule was conceived. 2
Thus, an arbitrator's view of the application of contract law to collective
bargaining agreements is likely to influence a decision to adopt the plain
meaning rule. A number of commentators have offered opposing views
regarding the role of principles of contract law in the interpretation of
labor agreements.8 3 At one extreme is the view that collective bargaining
78. For other cases rejecting the plain meaning rule, see supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text.
79. Corbin is cited extensively by courts, see, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Busi-
ness Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1980); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 36-39, 442 P.2d 641, 643-45, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 561, 563-65 (1968); United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 310-15
(2d Cir. 1955) and was one of the principal architects of the Restatement of Contracts
and the U.C.C., thus accounting for their rejection of the plain meaning rule. See supra
notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 311 (2d Cir. 1955)
(court cites Ihering, who taught in the nineteenth century, and fourteenth century Italian
lawyer Lucas De Penna, in its criticism of the plain meaning approach to contract
interpretation).
81. See infra note 128.
82. See Treece, Past Practice and its Relationship to Specific Contract Language in the
Arbitration of Grievance Disputes, 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 358, 372-73 (1968).
83. See Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L. J. 525,
525-27 (1969). A relatively recent addition to the literature was in an address by Sylves-
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agreements should not be treated as ordinary contracts, and common law
contract principles essentially are irrelevant."4 Others argue that basic
principles of contract law, while not strictly applicable, may provide val-
uable insights into the law of collective bargaining agreements.85 The
Supreme Court has taken the position that a collective bargaining agree-
ment is "more than a contract,"8 6 and that applicable law is not confined
to the express provisions of the agreement.8 7 The prevalent view seems
to embrace the notion that the collective bargaining agreement is a spe-
cial species of contract, and contract law has, at least, some application.88
The complicated industrial settings in which labor contracts are
adopted, and their unique characteristics, support these views.8 9 A labor
ter Garrett, past president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, who stated that
"some authorities still seek to create an impression that, in interpreting a collective bar-
gaining agreement, the arbitrator primarily must seek to find some appropriate rule for
contract interpretation (or set of rules) to be applied as though the parties had negotiated
conventional one-shot commercial contract." Garrett, Contract Interpretation, Arbitra-
tion 1985 Law and Practice, Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the
Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, 121, 142 (V. Gershenfeld ed. BNA 1986).
84. See Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L Rev.
999, 1016 (1955) (when terms are ambiguous, arbitrator must rely on his own judgment
as to correct interpretation.
Archibald Cox opines that pleas to discard contract law as it applies to the collective
agreement would be ignored by the courts. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1958) [hereinafter Cox I].
85. See Summers, supra note 83, at 537-47; see also Cox I, supra note 84, at 19
("There are rules applicable to 'common' or 'commercial' contracts which can be helpful
in resolving cases arising under collective bargaining agreements because they furnish the
conceptual tools of analysis even though the ultimate answer turns less on the concepts
than on evaluation of the functional aspects of the agreement.").
86. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
87. See id. at 581-82.
88. See Summers, supra note 83, at 537-47. Thus, arbitrators often apply basic con-
tract law principles. See In re Department of Econ. Sec. v. Minnesota Assoc. of Prof.
Employees, PERB Case No. 82-PP-92-B, at 8 (June 21, 1982) ("The test of whether the
parties have truly formed an agreement, according to principles of contract law, rests on
two propositions. The first involves the principle of offer and acceptance, the second
principle requires a meeting of minds.") (emphasis omitted); Tim Processing Corp. v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, 20 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 362, 363 (1953) (Johannes, Arb.) ("The arbi-
trator feels that both the Company and the Union failed to reach a proper meeting of the
minds."); Carlile & Doughty, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers,
Local 110, 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239, 241 (1947) (Brandschain, Arb.) ("The Union and the
Company each had a different idea as to what was meant by the language used. Their
minds did not meet.").
89. See Summers, supra note 83, at 527-34:
The multiplicity of parties and complexity of provisions, the incompleteness of
terms and the lack of agreement, the compulsory character of the bargaining
relationship, and the continuous relationship with successive agreements are as-
pects of the collective agreement which make it distinguishable from an ordi-
nary contract.
Cox points out that:
First, it is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-bargaining agreement is sim-
ply a document by which the union and employees have imposed upon manage-
ment limited, express restrictions of its otherwise absolute right to manage the
enterprise, so that an employee's claim must fail unless he can point to a specific
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agreement, as a manifestation of self-government, cannot begin to pro-
vide for all the contingencies that may affect its administration. 90 The
provisions of collective bargaining agreements inevitably contain some
general expressions and ambiguous terms. In some cases, because the
parties have implicit agreements and have developed a relationship over
the years, the agreements are not intended to have an indisputable
meaning. 9
Strict application of the principles of contract law to collective bar-
gaining agreements, therefore, can lead to an unsatisfactory analysis of
issues submitted to a labor arbitrator. Given the complexity of the labor-
management relationship, application of the rule to labor agreements
might be even less appropriate than in commercial contract cases. Be-
cause the rule excludes evidence that may illuminate the relationship of
the parties, the duty of an arbitrator to unravel bargaining history and to
understand the intent of the parties as expressed in their agreement can
be thwarted.
Other factors may influence the decision to apply the rule, such as the
arbitrator's attitudes toward a management rights clause,92 the preceden-
tial value of prior arbitration awards,93 whether the collective bargaining
contract provision upon which the claim is founded. There are too many peo-
ple, too many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the
words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot
reduce all the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or
even fifty pages. Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional
characteristics and the governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process
demand a common law of the shop which implements and furnishes the context
of the agreement. We must assume that intelligent negotiators acknowledged so
plain a need unless they stated a contrary rule in plain words.
Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1498-99 (1959) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter Cox II].
90. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-82(1960); Anaconda Co. v. Great Falls Mill & Smeltermen's Union No. 16, 402 F.2d 749,
750 (9th Cir. 1968).
91. "The plain meaning of the words may fall far short of expressing agreements
implicit in the peculiar collective bargaining relationship evolved by the parties over a
period of years; the words may even be inaccurate in light of subsequent events." Cox,
Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 247, 262
(1958) [hereinafter Cox III].
92. Many collective bargaining agreements inclue a management rights clause. The
purpose of the clause is to preserve management's unfettered discretion in all areas not
specifically granted to the union in the agreement. The clause affects consideration of
extrinsic evidence offered to prove contractual intent. For example, when a past practice
is inconsistent with contractual language, the significance of the practice may be lessened
if the arbitrator views the practice as an exercise of management's bargained-for preroga-
tive. The practice likely will not be accorded contractual status or be considered evidence
of contractual intent. See ITT Continental Baking Co. v. Bakery, Confectionery and
Tobacco Workers Union Local 218, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 92, 95 (1980) (Ross, Arb.)
("Arbitrators are hesitant to permit unwritten past practice to restrict the exercise of
legitimate functions of management.").
93. Diverse views exist concerning the precedential value of prior arbitration awards.
A survey of arbitrators disclosed that 77% believed other arbitration decisions should be
given "some weight," but they should not be regarded as binding. Warren & Bernstein, A
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agreement should be narrowly or broadly construed, a past practice
clause,94 as well as value judgments of arbitrators.95 Although such fac-
tors are not always disclosed in arbitral opinions, arbitrators often ex-
plain that the plain meaning rule is an inevitable means of resolving a
particular grievance. 96 Such decisions generally suggest that the rule is
considered a settled principle of contract and arbitration law.9 7
Arbitrators also explain application of the plain meaning rule as con-
sistent with contractual limitations on their authority. It is not unusual
for arbitrators to contend that arbitration clauses in labor contracts98
Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 970, 982 (1951); see also Braniff Air-
ways v. International Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8214, at
3706-07 (1969) (Platt, Arb.) (prior arbitration decisions have no binding force).
94. See generally Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L Rev.
3, 4-5 (1963) (discussing literal versus liberal construction and interpretation); see also
Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process Substantive Decision-Making in Labor Arbi-
tration, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 551, 561 (1981) (arbitrators follow express language of agree-
ment, but when a situation is not covered by the agreement, established past practices
may be referred to).
95. At least one writer argues that ideas about ethics, people, law, private property,
and economics provide arbitrators with ultimate standards for judgment. See Gross,
Value of Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 21 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 55
(1967); see also Seitz, Communications, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbi-
trators, 21 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 427 (1968) (doubting that standards for judgment can
be discerned from text of arbitral opinions).
The role of value judgments in arbitration is developed more fully in Landis, Value
Judgments in Arbitration: A Case Study of Saul Wallen, Cornell University (1977). See
also Moore Co. v. Directly Affiliated Local Union No. 22804, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) $ 8337, at 4410 (1979) (Bornstein, Arb.) ("The most familiar way to incorporate
past practices into a contract by reference is through a so-called 'past practices' clause or
a 'freeze' or 'maintenance of benefits' clause.").
An example of such a clause is found in the contract at issue in Sunshine Mining Co. v.
United Steelworkers Local No. 5089, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) , 8537, at 5377
(1979) (O'Neill, Arb.):
All present local practices, understandings or supplements or working condi-
tions which grant to the employees benefits and protections not othervise pro-
vided by the Agreement, shall remain in effect unless changed by mutual
agreement, and in no case shall such local understanding, supplement or condi-
tion of employment be effective to deprive any employee of his rights under the
Agreement.
96. See Kennecott Copper Corp., Ray Mines Division v. International Bhd. of Elec-
trical Workers, Local 314, 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8849, at 5851 (1970) (Aber-
nethy, Arb.) ("the Arbitrator has little choice but to hold that the plain meaning of the
Contract language under consideration here must be enforced").
97. See, eg., Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphite Arts Int'l Union Local 12B, 80
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 623, 625 (1983) (Reynolds, Arb.) (use of past practice limited to issues
in which language of agreement is vague or inconsistent); Amax Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of America, Local 1216, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1058, 1063 (1981) (Witney, Arb.)("When there is a conflict between past practice and unambiguous contractual language,
the contractual language supersedes the practice"); Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Retail Clerks
Local Union 770, 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845, 848 (1974) (Petrie, Arb.) (custom and past
practice not ordinarily used to give meaning to clear and unambiguous provision); F.
Elkouri & E. Elkouri, supra note 2, at 348-50 (when contract language is clear and unam-
biguous, arbitrators will apply the plain meaning rule).
98. These clauses commonly provide that the arbitrator shall not "change, alter,
modify, or add to any of the terms or provisions of [the] agreement." Kraft Foods Co. v.
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place significant restraints on their ability to look beyond the express
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 99 In reality, however,
courts, arbitrators, and commentators are in disagreement about the sig-
nificance of standard "no modification" clauses. Torrington Co. v. Metal
Products Workers Union Local 1645 "o often has been cited for the prop-
osition that "no modification" clauses in a labor agreement must be care-
fully scrutinized to determine what restraint has been placed on an
arbitrator's authority. 01 Treatise writers in the field of arbitration have
supported that viewpoint.10 2 Other courts and writers, however, have
concluded that such limiting clauses are not necessarily a significant re-
straint on the arbitrator's authority.1 0 3
Grobery Warehousemen's Union Local 595, 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 962, 964 (1947) (Che-
ney, Ford, Gustafson, Arbs.).
99. See, e.g., Willamina Educ. Ass'n v. Willamina School District, 5 PECBR 4086,
4103 (1980) (Ellis, Hein, Mosey, Bd. members); Control for Radiation, Inc. v. United
Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 1, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 578, 583 (1966)(Stouffer, Arb.). Prasow and Peters contend that if the language of a provision is clear,
and its meaning "free of doubt," an arbitrator can go no further. They continue that the
arbitrator
may not go behind the language to probe for an intent other than the one dis-
closed by a simple reading of the provision. The language, it is said, speaks for
itself. In contract law an agreement is not ambiguous if the arbitrator can de-
termine its meaning with no other guide than knowledge of the simple facts on
which, from the nature of language in general, its meaning depends.
P. Prasow & E. Peters, supra note 12, at 90.
100. 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
101. See id. at 679-80; Loveless v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.10 (11th
Cir. 1982) (citing Torrington).
102. See F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, supra note 2, at 412 ("the general denial of power to
add to, subtract from, or modify the agreement provides special justification for the ob-
servance of the parol evidence rule by arbitrators," without regard for evidence of the
true intention of the parties).
103. See, e.g., Lodge No. 12, Int'l ass'n of Mach. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292
F.2d 112, 118 (5th Cir.) (no modification clause does not prevent arbitrator from finding
rights implied though not expressed in collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 926 (1961).
Several arbitrators argue that in accordance with the tenor of United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), evidence of past practice should be
considered even when the contract contains restrictive arbitrator authority clauses. See
Gilman, Past Practice in the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Arbi-
tration, 4 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 689, 709 (1970); see also Treece, supra note 82, at 369 & n.49(conclusive effect of no modification clause is inconsistent with tenor of Warrior).
The court in Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & A.W.I.U., 412 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1969), criticizes Torrington by referring to the modification clause contained
therein as "boiler-plate." The Holly Sugar court cites Judge Feinberg's dissent in Tor-
rington as the proper approach. Id. at 904-05. The court held that an arbitrator may
look to prior practice, the conduct of the negotiation, and other extrinsic evidence with-
out violating his duty to draw "the essence" from the eollective bargaining agreement.
Id.
Additionally, the court, in Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers, 545 F. Supp. 387 (D. S.C. 1982), found that a modification clause was
clear on its face but construed it as ambiguous when considered with the contract as a
whole. Id. at 392-94. The court further stated that the Second Circuit has limited Tor-
rington to situations in which the collective bargaining agreement contains no provisions
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In Loveless v. Eastern Airlines,"'4 the Eleventh Circuit suggested that,
even if a labor agreement contains a "no modification" clause, an arbitra-
tor may look beyond the express terms of the agreement on the theory
that a latent ambiguity exists.' °5 Under this theory, an arbitrator may
resort to extrinsic evidence to discern a latent ambiguity. 6 Characteriz-
ing a contractual provision as latently ambiguous, therefore, would pre-
clude application of the plain meaning rule by the rule's own terms.10 7
B. Application of the Plain Meaning Rule in Arbitration Decisions
Arbitrators often use the plain meaning approach to resolve grievances
that require using principles of contract interpretation. 0" A determina-
tion that contractual language is ambiguous" 9 generally has been viewed
by arbitrators as a basis for admitting extrinsic evidence. "o On the other
hand, when contractual language is perceived by the arbitrator as clear
and unambiguous, the plain meaning rule generally has been applied to
exclude extrinsic evidence. 1
bearing remotely on the dispute, and does not apply where industry practices may be
relevant in interpreting ambiguous provisions. Id at 393-94.
104. 681 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982).
105. Id at 1278-79 n.14.
106. "An arbitrator may be able to discern a latent ambiguity in a contrct based upon
his examination of past practice or bargaining history even though no ambiguity appears
on the face of the contract." Id at 1279 n.14.
107. "The arbitrator might then be able to resolve the latent ambiguity by resort to
permissible sources of extrinsic evidence." Id
108. The rule typically is referred to as an established arbitral rule followed by a de-
scription of its operative effect. See Gibson Refrigerator Co. v. United Auto., Aircraft &
Agric. Implement Workers, Local 137, 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 313, 317 (1951) (Platt,
Arb.).
109. Contract language that is either general or silent on a matter is equated to ambig-
uous language under the plain meaning rule. On general contract language, see Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. International Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
% 824, 3705 (1969) (Platt, Arb.) ("It is doubtless true that reference may be had to past
practice to ascertain if the parties by their own conduct in the course of performance have
given a particular meaning to their general or indefinite language.").
On silent contract language, see Kiamesha Concord, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees' & Bartenders' Int'l Union Local 343, 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) I" 8586,
5003 (1969) (Kerrison, Arb.) ("where a contract is either silent on a matter at issue, or
ambiguous.... past practice carries most weight"); see generally Mittenthal, Past Practice
and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, Arbitration and Public Pol-
icy, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, 30,
38 (S. Pollard, ed. 1961) (when language is ambiguous, day-to-day administration of
agreement will develop the meaning).
110. See eg., Adjutant Gen'l v. Pennsylvania State Council Ass'n of Civilian Techni-
cians, Inc., 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 859, 5636 (1980) (Yatsko, Arb.) ("meaning
of the operative words 'unit/activity' is not free from doubt and ... therefore it is neces-
sary to resort to extrinsic evidence").
111. See Thunderbird Hotel v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
Local 720, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 10, 13 (1977) (Weiss, Arb.); Hi-Ram, Inc. v. United
Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, Local 1627, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 54,
55-56 (1977) (Daniel, Arb.); Arkansas Chem., Inc. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union Local 5-434, 73-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8175, 3651 (1973) (Holly, Arb.);
American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Mach., Local Lodge 845, 47
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Thus, the nature of contractual language generally is dispositive of
whether the plain meaning rule will operate to exclude extrinsic evi-
dence. Arbitrators take a variety of approaches to determine whether
contractual language is "plain" or "ambiguous." In a number of cases,
arbitrators have concluded that facts of the case dictate the result
reached.112 Other arbitrators have determined whether a particular pro-
vision is "plain" or "ambiguous" by examining the manner of a provi-
sion's application throughout the agreement to determine whether it has
been applied consistently.113 In other cases, arbitrators have relied heav-
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 661, 665-66 (1966) (Leonard, Arb.). Arkansas Chemicals involved a
dispute over whether payment of wages to an employee who suffered an accident should
be made on the basis of a calendar week or a work week. Both parties agreed that the
consistent past practice with respect to industrial injury pay had been to use the work
week, with the result that employees received more money than they would have if wages
were calculated on a calendar week basis. The arbitrator decided that the contract
clearly and unambiguously stated that a calendar week was to be used. Id. at 3650-52.
He concluded that a practice that is contrary to clear and unambiguous contractual lan-
guage does not have a binding effect on the parties. The arbitrator reasoned that, pursu-
ant to a provision of the contract delineating his authority, his award had to be drawn
from the essence of the agreement. Id. at 3651. Referring to the plain neaning rule as
arbitral authority, he concluded that this principle of contract construction required him
to disregard the past practice of the parties. Id. at 3651.
112. See Patterson Steel Co. v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamen-
tal Iron Workers, Shopmen's Local 620, 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 783 (1965) (Autrey, Arb.).
Patterson Steel Co. involved a terminated employee's entitlement to vacation pay. The
employee maintained that he was entitled to a pro-rated amount of two week's vacation,
while the company argued that under the contract the grievant was entitled to payment
for a portion of one week's vacation. The company further argued that its interpretation
of the contract was consistent with past practice. The arbitrator acknowledged that the
pertinent contract language was "tangled and involved" because of the phrase "preceding
and/or succeeding eligibility date." He nevertheless concluded that the language was not
ambiguous when "applied to the facts of the particular case involved." The arbitrator
apparently made the determination that the language was not ambiguous by concluding
that application of the union's interpretation would produce an unreasonable result. An
employee discharged the day before his third anniversary date would receive one week's
vacation, while an employee discharged on a third anniversary date would receive two
weeks paid vacation. Id. at 786.
In American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge
845, 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 661 (1966) (Leonard, Lease, McCullough, Arbs.), the employer
characterized replacement of a filtering system as "production and maintenance work,"
paying employees regular production and maintenance wage rates. The union argued
that installation of the filter was a "construction project," entitling employees to a higher
construction wage. Although the chief arbitrator acknowledged that the relevant con-
tract provision defining a "construction project" could be construed as ambiguous, he
concluded that the language was not ambiguous when applied to the facts in the case. Id.
at 665. By constructing an exaggerated hypothetical, Arbitrator Leonard reasoned that
the application of the employer's interpretation would render the contract language
"meaningless." Id.
113. See Community Mental Health Center v. American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees Local 231, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1236 (1981) (Mueller, Arb.). In Com-
munity Mental Health Center, the arbitrator examined the application of contractual pro-
visions that granted benefits to part-time employees on a pro-rata basis to other benefit
areas in the contract and concluded that the clause was "extremely unclear." Id. at 1238-
40. In contrast to American Potash, 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 661 (1966), and Patterson Steel
Co., 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 783 (1965), the arbitrator maintained that simply applying the
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ily on dictionary definitions to determine whether the relevant contrac-
tual clause is "plain" or "ambiguous." '14 Even when admissibility of
extrinsic evidence apparently is not at issue in a case, arbitrators may
struggle to characterize contractual language as "clear" or "ambigu-
ous," 115 adopting a plain meaning approach to contract interpretation.
C. The Relationship of the Plain Meaning Rule and the Concept of
Past Practice
In many cases, the extrinsic evidence that is disregarded when an arbi-
trator applies the plain meaning rule is proof of a consistent prior course
of conduct not covered by the agreement,1 16 commonly characterized as
a past practice. A past practice must be clear and consistent, endure over
a reasonable length of time, and be an accepted course of conduct.
1 17
contract language to the facts of the case would not clear up the ambiguous nature of the
contractual provision. Id. at 1240.
114. See Department of Health, Educ., and Welfare v. American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, Local 1802, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 788, 794 (1979) (Hayes, Arb.); Thunderbird
Hotel v. International Alliance of Theatrical Workers, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 10, 13 (1977)
(Weiss, Arb.); Pana Refining Co. v. Local 584, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 193 (1966) (Traynor, Arb.). Pana Refining Co. involved in-
terpretation of a contractual provision relevant to determining whether a former
employee was entitled to pro-rated vacation pay for the portion of the year he worked.
The arbitrator determined that the words constituting the contractual provision "under
dictionary definitions [were] not uncertain in [their] meaning or ambiguous." Id. at 195.
The dictionary approach to contract interpretation has been severely criticized: "[lit is
one of the surest [indices] of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress
out of the dictionary." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S.
404 (1945). In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), Justice
Brennan stated in his concurrence that "[t]he meaning of the arbitration promise is not to
be found simply by reference to the dictionary definitions of the words the parties use, or
by reference to the interpretation of commercial arbitration clauses." 363 U.S. at 570
(Brennan, J., concurring).
115. See John Morrell & Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen,
Local 304, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 933, 937 (1975) (Davis, Arb.) ("The arbitrator agrees
that there is no ambiguity. The arbitrator is presented, however, with a choice as to which
of the allegedly clear and unambiguous interpretations is correct.") (emphasis in
original).
116. See e.g., Byer-Rolnick Corp. v. United Hatters, Cap & Millinery Workers, 45
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 868, 873 (1965) (Ray, Arb.) (evidence of past practice of laying off
employees by seniority disregarded in light of clear, unambiguous contractual language
that provided that ability of employees to perform work would be primary criterion for
layoffs).
117. [T]he party claiming a past practice has the obligation to assume the burden
of persuasion that there was a past practice and what its nature and scope of
coverage and application may be. That proof should show that the practice is
unequivocal, clearly enunciated and acted upon, and readily ascertainable over
a reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both
parties.
Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers Dist. 20, Local 6255, 82-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) f 8518, 5314 (1982) (citing Arbitration Review Board Decision 78-2).
Characteristics of a past practice have been noted in numerous arbitration decisions. See,
ag., Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 20, Local
Union No. 6255, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8518, 5314 (1982) (Clarke, Arb.) (re-
jected claim of past practice of reimbursing injured employees' transportation expenses
1987]
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Traditionally, and in accordance with the plain meaning rule, when a
practice has been inconsistent with a seemingly clear and unambiguous
contractual provision, the practice has been disregarded and the plain
meaning of the language in the agreement affirmed. 18
In Chicago Educational Television Association,' 19 a company failed to
post a temporary employee's name on a seniority list within twenty-four
hours of hiring in accordance with contractual seniority list posting pro-
visions. 120 The company argued that names of temporary employees
were never posted on the seniority list until permanently employed and
that the union had acquiesced in this practice. In resolving whether the
past practice or the express provisions of the agreement should prevail,
the arbitrator termed the answer "easy and unavoidable.' 12' He rea-
soned that the reference to "all new Technicians employed" in the rele-
vant contractual provision unambiguously meant all classes of
employees, including those with temporary status. 122 The arbitrator con-
cluded that the practice could not alter the clear language of the agree-
ment that required posting of the names of all employees within twenty-
four hours. 12
3
The arbitrator seemingly adopted the extreme form of the plain mean-
ing rule by denying the relevance of the practice at even the initial stage
of classifying the contractual language as "clear" or "ambiguous." This
characterization of the contractual provision had been made after a sur-
face examination of the agreement, without consideration of the practice
or other extrinsic evidence. Even after a summary examination of the
provision, however, the relevant language arguably could have been clas-
sified as general language. 124 According to the plain meaning rule, gen-
eral contractual language is considered ambiguous. 125 Even under this
theory, therefore, the practice should have been admissible to clarify the
for getting medical treatment because of failure to establish unequivocal, clearly enunci-
ated and acted upon practice); Arizona Aluminum Co. v. International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers Local 428, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 766, 768-69 (1982) (Sass, Arb.) (rejecting
company's assertion that joint discipline by management and union was past practice
accepted by union); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Ass'n of Mach. Lodge 851,
78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 241, 242-43 (1982) (Cohen, Arb.) (rejecting company's assertion of
past practice of prohibiting over twelve hour work days); Joy Mfg. Co. v. International
Ass'n of Mach. Local 1842, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 683, 683 (1981) (Richard, Arb.) (no
binding past practice showing mutual intent of parties to compensate employees deprived
of overtime opportunity in violation of overtime provision of agreement).
118. 363 U.S. 574, 580, 589 (1960).
119. 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8516 (1970) (Daughtery, Arb.).
120. Id. at 4692.
121. Id.
122. "[S]aid agreement sets forth [the seniority-list-posting requirements] with the ut-
most brevity and clarity-and with no qualifications or exceptions whatsoever..." Id.
123. Id.
124. The specifics of the posting provision could have been left to be hammered out in
the administration of the agreement.
125. See supra note 108.
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meaning of the clause.126
Similarly, if the arbitrator had adopted the Thomas Drayage test, the
practice would have been relevant from the onset to prove whether the
provision "reasonably" was susceptible to alternative meanings. 2 ' On a
finding that the provision was susceptible to different meanings, the prac-
tice also would have been admissible to clarify the meaning of the provi-
sion itself.28 The evidentiary significance of the practice would have
been a further question to be decided by the arbitrator. The arbitrator's
use of the plain meaning analysis, however, theoretically precluded as-
sessing the significance of the practice at any stage of the proceeding.
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent should have made clear to arbi-
trators that the plain meaning rule is an inappropriate standard. In
126. The reading of the clause as clear, or alternatively as general, illustrates a major
weakness of the plain meaning rule. An arbitrator can reach the result he or she thinks
proper, and then support a holding by characterizing the language one way or another.
127. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d
33, 37, 442 P.2d 641, 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564 (1968); supra notes 65-69 and accompa-
nying text.
128. For other opinions upholding the view that past practice is not admissible to in-
terpret unambiguous contract language, see Connecticut Ready Mixed Concrete Ass'n v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 559, 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 251, 254 (1964) (Wallen,
Arb.) ("neither practice [nor] unilateral declarations of intent can vary clear agreement
terms"); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec., Radio, and Machine
Workers Local 410, 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 573, 577 (1964) (Howard, Arb.) ("past practice
cannot alter clear and unambiguous contract language"); Murphy Oil Co. v. Local 7-482,
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 206, 209 (1963)
(Whitney, Arb.) ("When practice conflicts with unequivocal contractual language, the
latter must be given preference, since it is the written language rather than the custom
which represents the fundamental and true intent of the parties.").
In the public sector, arbitrators seem to rely on the plain meaning rule to exclude
evidence of past practices to the same extent as do their counterparts in the private sector.
See County of Ulster v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n Local 856, 1982 Lab. Arb. Gov't IF
3041, at 6 (1982) (Irsay, Arb.) (longstanding practice of offering option of overtime pay
or compensation time cannot overcome clear and unambiguous language of the contract);
City of Riverview v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees Local 1590,
1981 Lab. Arb. Gov't 2827, at 5 (1981) (Jones, Arb.) ("if the provision is clear and free
from ambiguity, it is generally held that the express terms of the provision govern");
Town of Salem v. Salem Police Relief, 1980 Lab. Arb. Gov't 2555, at 20 (1980) (Bar-
low, Arb.) (past practice must "not vary the express written terms of the labor agree-
ment"); Metropolitan Dade County v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1403,
1980 Lab. Arb. Gov't 9 2526, at 7 (1980) (Sherman, Arb.) (since contract language re-
garding filling of vacancies is unambiguous, the arbitrator was precluded from giving
weight to evidence of a contrary intent); City of Middletown v. Middletown Police Be-
nevolent Ass'n, 1980 Lab. Arb. Gov't 2521, at 8 (1979) (Dennis, Arb.) ("only under
extreme circumstances can a practice be raised to modify clear contract language"); see
also Municipal Lighting Plant Comm'n v. American Fed. of State, County and Mun.
Employees Local 1729, 1979 Lab. Arb. Gov't 2424, at 6 (1979) (Bloodsworth, Arb.)
(past practice cannot be used to override clear and unambiguous language); St. Lawrence
County v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n, 1977 Lab. Arb. Gov't 1 1866, at 6-7 (1977)
(Markowitz, Arb.) (Arbitrator Markowitz maintains that "[a]rbitrators, especially in the
public sector, have been adjured to obey the clear language of the contract and not legis-
late substituting language in its stead because of extrinsic considerations of past practice
and the like.").
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United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,' 29 the Court held
that "industrial common law"-the practices of the industry and the
shop-is part of the collective bargaining agreement even if it is not an
express provision. 3'
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES To PAST PRACTICE CASES
While no direct attack has been launched on the general use of the
plain meaning rule in arbitration, the rule has been criticized seriously in
connection with its exclusionary effect on the admissibility of evidence of
a past practice.13' As a substitute, Arbitrator Aaron has proposed an
approach to past practice cases, which has been referred to as the "inher-
ent ambiguity theory."'' 32  Professor Aaron would give controlling
weight to a past practice inconsistent with a contractual provision that is
plain on its face but, in fact, is ambiguous. 33 This approach is based on
the theory that giving the practice controlling weight takes note of a
modification that already has been made by the contracting parties. 134
The theory, however, applies only when the relevant contractual lan-
guage is inherently ambiguous. Arbitrator Mittenthal has suggested that
past practice can override even unambiguous contractual language when
the practice is mutually accepted by the contracting parties.' His the-
ory rests on the belief that the collective bargaining agreement governs
an ongoing relationship, and the parties should be able to modify the
agreement in accordance with the parol modification theory of contract
law.' 3
6
129. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
130. Id. at 581-582.
131. See generally Aaron, The Uses of the Past in Arbitration, Arbitration Today, Pro-
ceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 1 (1955);
Gilman, supra note 103; McLaughlin, Custom and Past Practice in Labor Arbitration, 18
Arb. J. 205 (1963); Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements, in Arbitration and Public Policy, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 30 (S. Pollard ed. 1961); Treece, supra note
82; Comment, The Doctrine of Past Practice in Labor Arbitration, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 229
(1966).
132. See Treece, supra note 82, at 375.
133. Aaron notes several factors relevant to a finding that a contractual provision is
inherently ambiguous. First, the contracting parties thought that they were covering
every possible contingency that might arise in the application of a provision when, in fact,
they did not; second, the parties adopted the relevant provision from a different contract
without discussion of what it meant; and third, the parties merely intended to cover situa-
tions that they had already experienced and not thereby to exclude other situations which
could arise. Aaron, supra note 131, at 5-6.
134. See id. at 7. Aaron points out that this rationale justifies giving a practice control-
ling weight, even when the contract prohibits the arbitrator from adding to, subtracting
from, or modifying its provisions.
135. See Mittenthal, supra note 109, at 42-44.
136. Mittenthal cites the following passage from 3 S. Williston, Contracts § 623 (rev.
ed. 1936): " '[I]f the meaning of the contract is plain, the acts of the parties cannot prove
an interpretation contrary to the plain meaning' but neverthless 'such conduct of the
parties... may be evidence of a subsequent modification of their contract.'" Id. at 44.
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Both of these approaches have been criticized by one commentator to
the extent that they embrace the traditional parameters of the plain
meaning rule. 13 7 Arbitrator Treece suggests that the problem of deter-
mining the applicable rule of decision in past practices cases should be
viewed essentially as an evidentiary matter. 3 ' An arbitrator's aim is to
search for the mutual intent of the parties in any given grievance dispute,
and both the collective agreement and past practice are manifestations of
the parties' intent. Arbitrator Treece believes that the respective signifi-
cance of the language or the practice is simply a process of weighing the
evidence. The degree of ambiguity of the applicable contractual language
and the acceptability of the practice are only relevant to the weight to be
accorded to them. 139
This approach to past practice cases rejects the attempt to characterize
contractual language as either clear or ambiguous, and therefore avoids
the result that the plain meaning rule dictates. Arbitrator Treece goes as
far as maintaining that, in cases where the arbitrator deems the practice
and the language to be of equal weight or is in doubt about their relative
significance, the practice should prevail."4
These approaches to past practice have been adopted by a number of
arbitration cases. Great Lakes Carbon Corp. 4' involved whether holiday
pay included applicable shift differentials. The arbitrator noted the
agreement unambiguously provided that shift differential should be ad-
ded to holiday pay. He concluded, however, that the Union's nine year
acquiescence in the computation of holiday pay without adding the shift
differentials constituted a practice that, in effect, amended the parties'
agreement.142 He concluded that the contractual provision to the con-
trary had "lost any significance."'143
In Smith Display Service,'" the Union claimed that the Company had
been making improper payments to a fund, violating the Social Security
provision of the agreement with the union. Although the Company de-
ducted an amount representing work related expenses before computing
See also Evening News Ass'n v. Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372, 54 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 716 (1970) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
137. Treece states:
Aaron would reject the past practice, no matter how clearly established and no
matter how high the degree of underlying acceptability, if unable to find an
inherent ambiguity. Conversely, Mittenthal would reject the practice, no matter
how inherently ambiguous the relevant contract language, unless it was sup-
ported by a degree of acceptability tantamount to mutual agreement.
Treece, supra note 82, at 377.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 378.
141. 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1173 (1964) (Anrod, Arb.).
142. Id. at 1176.
143. Id. at 1177.
144. Smith Display Serv. v. United Furniture Workers, 17 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 524
(1951) (Sherbow, Arb.).
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the payment, the Union maintained that the agreement clearly provided
for payment to the Union fund based on gross wages. The arbitrator con-
cluded that the duration of the practice and the acquiescence by the
Union in that course of conduct prevailed over even unambiguous con-
tractual language.145
Although these cases represent a departure from strict application of
the rule and the approach found in most arbitration decisions on the
subject, they have received increasing support from commentators 46 and
the courts.'47 Arbitrators need to be aware of the progress that has been
made in rejecting the plain meaning rule, and in broadening their inter-
pretive authority, so that the rule can be relegated to a less conspicuous
role in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
CONCLUSION
Arbitrators' continued invocation of the plain meaning rule is anoma-
lous in light of the trend to reject the rule by the courts, the U.C.C., the
Restatement, and treatise writers. The plain meaning rule is a vestige of
an earlier, formalistic period of interpretation that has made way for ap-
proaches to principles of contract interpretation that are less mechanical
and less fictional in their application. The basic premise of the rule that
assumes words are capable of unambiguous meanings has been disputed
by semanticists, philosophers, legal commentators, and case law. Addi-
tionally, because the plain meaning rule requires an initial characteriza-
145. Id. at 526. A number of other arbitrators express similar views. Yet, the facts of
the particular cases do not support a finding that the alleged practice overrides clear
contract language. See C. Schmidt Co. v. Allied Indus. Workers, Local 157, 46 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1208, 1212 (1966) (vol. 2) (Volz, Arb.) ("[l]n a proper case a practice mutu-
ally agreed to may constitute a waiver of an express term in the contract and may itself
rise to the dignity of an implied provision of the agreement."); Mobil Oil Co. v. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union Local 4-243, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 140, 151 (1966)
(Hebert, Turner, Williams, Arbs.) ("[6]n the basis of very strong proof it has been held
that the language of the contract may be amended as evidenced by past practice. The
showing required must be the equivalent to mutual agreement."); Wheland Foundry v.
United Steelworkers Local 3967, 44 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5, 6 (1965) (Williams, Arb.) ("Past
violations are not the same as past practices, and numerous breaches of a contract do not
amend the instrument.").
146. See generally R. A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, 592-93 (1976) (arbitrator
may supplement written contract with past practice); Mittenthal, supra note 131, 43-44
(past practice amounts to an amendment of contract, which can "only be changed by
mutual agreement"); Treece, supra note 82, at 378 ("clearly established prior course of
conduct ... should be given controlling weight over very clear contractual language").
147. It is not altogether unusual for a court to affirm an arbitrator's use of past practice
in a "gap-filling" situation when no contractual provision is on point. See Anaconda Co.
v. Great Falls Mill & Smeltermen's Union No. 16, 402 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1968)
(affirmed arbitrator's reliance on "common law of the shop" in determining violation of
seniority provision of collective bargaining agreement). Furthermore, recent decisions
show courts allowing past practice and other extrinsic evidence to override express and
unambiguous contract language in order to implement the parties' intent. See Loveless v.
Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock v. Local No. 684, 671 F.2d 797, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1982).
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tion of contractual language as "plain" or "ambiguous," an arbitrator
may substitute a personal conception of the parties' intent, in accordance
with the arbitrator's own linguistic history, rather than in accordance
with the actual intent of the parties.
Adherence to the plain meaning rule by arbitrators derives from their
belief that the rule is a settled and unquestioned principle of contract law.
The use of the rule by arbitrators can be traced to their views on the
application of contract law to collective bargaining agreements and to
more fundamental value judgments concerning the nature of the collec-
tive bargaining process. Such arbitral values may not have been applied
consciously but may merely reflect an uncritical application of textbook
principles in the field of arbitration.
Because the rule often operates to exclude evidence of past practice
inconsistent with contractual language, much of the criticism of the rule
has arisen in connection with discussions about the role of past practice
in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. Some commentators
have urged that an established practice should be capable of overriding
contractual provisions. They suggest that apparently clear language, in
fact, can be ambiguous and that the collective bargaining agreement gov-
erns a continuing relationship that should be capable of modification by a
mutually accepted practice. Still another view urges that cases in which
past practice contradicts language in the agreement should be treated as
essentially an evidentiary problem in which the arbitrator must weigh the
relative significance of the practice and the contractual provison.
The effort of some commentators to modify the plain meaning rule in
past practice cases clearly has application to the troublesome use of the
rule in labor arbitration generally. It probably is never justifiable to re-
fuse to admit relevant evidence as a means of explaining the meaning of a
contractual provision in a collective bargaining agreement unless it is rea-
sonable to determine the meaning the parties gave to words in that agree-
ment from the contract alone and without any reference at all to extrinsic
evidence. To the extent that such cases exist, the plain meaning rule
should be invoked.
In most cases, the plain meaning rule should be applied only in con-
junction with a number of modifying rules. For example, consistent with
Thomas Drayage, the process of characterizing contractual language as
"ambiguous" or "unambiguous" pursuant to the plain meaning rule
should be discarded in favor of an approach that does not deny the rele-
vance of extrinsic evidence to prove meanings to which a contractual
provision is reasonably susceptible. Additionally, extrinsic evidence
should be admissible to resolve the contended meanings of a contractual
provision. Using this approach, contract interpretation is similar to an
evidentiary problem in which the significance of the terms of the agree-
ment and the contended extrinsic evidence must be allocated the appro-
priate weight. Such an approach to contract interpretation strengthens
the chance that the intent of the parties will be effectuated and eliminates
1987]
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the harsh consequences that can result from an application of the plain
meaning rule.
